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Key points 
This Policy Brief urges the European Union to consider reinforcing the Energy Community 
by  further  Europeanising  the  Energy  Community  Treaty.  It  argues  that  the  level  of 
dysfunctionality with respect to the rule of law and corruption will make it very hard to 
establish a pathway for accession for most Balkan states. However, the demand across the 
region for a sustainable, competitive and stable energy sector creates an ‘energy incentive’ 
that the Union can leverage to improve the rule of law and adherence to European rules. 
Furthermore, a juridical strengthening of the Energy Community Treaty will also strengthen 
the hand of those parties supporting energy liberalisation rules across the region, such as 
independent businesses, consumers and NGOs. In addition, there is likely to be significant 
spill-over effects from decisions of a European Energy Community Court operating in the 
region on the rule of law in general and the accession process in particular. 
The paper proposes juridical strengthening of the Energy Community Treaty, to include: 
  An  Energy  Community  Court  with  powers  to  hear  direct  actions  from  the  Energy 
Secretariat,  state  parties,  the  EU  institutions,  EU  member  states  and private parties 
with a direct and legitimate interest. 
  A preliminary reference procedure from the courts of the state parties to the Energy 
Community Court. 
  Elevating the role of the Energy Secretariat to that of a regional European Commission 
in the energy sector. It would include full powers on the European model to enforce 
the antitrust, state aid and merger rules within the sector. 
  Extension  of  the  acquis  covered  by  the  Energy  Community  Treaty  to  cover  all 
environmental and free movement rules that affect the energy sector. 2 | ALAN RILEY 
 
1.  Introduction 
The Energy Community1 seeks to provide a liberalised and open energy market in South-
East Europe and the Black Sea region, where capital can be attracted to build a modern and 
sustainable energy sector. The difficulty with these objectives is that the Energy Community 
is ultimately dependent on the EU’s energy acquis operating in the sub-optimal rule-of-law 
context  of  South-East  Europe.  The  Union’s  enlargement  programme  aims  to  tackle  the 
weaknesses with respect to the rule of law in the region.2  
This paper argues that the current integration strategy can be significantly reinforced by 
recognising the overriding importance of the rule of law in the energy sector. Due to the 
weaknesses of capital formation in the energy sector in the region prior to 1989, the damage 
inflicted  by  war  in  the  1990s  and  the  need  for  more  sustainable  energy  sources  to  be 
developed, there is a hunger for capital in the regional energy market.3 Given the sheer scale 
of capital required in the energy sector, this need creates a major incentive that the EU can 
deploy to reinforce the rule of law, the effective application of the energy acquis and the 
progress of the Energy Community states towards full EU membership. There is a growing 
recognition among political elites, the business community, investors and consumers across 
the  region  of  the  need  to  expand  and  develop  a  sustainable  energy  system.  For  that 
investment to flow, however, strong rule of law mechanisms need to be put in place. This 
paper argues that the EU should consider taking steps to further Europeanise the Energy 
Community Treaty in order to strengthen the rule of law in the region.  
A  significant  further  Europeanisation  of  the  Energy  Community  Treaty  would  include 
providing for an EFTA-style court, expanding the scope of the application of the Treaty to all 
four  freedoms  and  creating  a  powerful  antitrust  enforcement  competence  within  the 
Secretariat.  It  is  contended  that  such  a  Europeanisation  programme  would  significantly 
enhance the operation of the rule of law in the regional sector and create a much more open 
and reliable single energy market, which would attract investment on a large scale into the 
region. The programme would generate mutual reinforcing effects to improve governance 
and compliance on the ground with the whole EU energy acquis on the way to membership 
of the Union. 
Section 2 of this paper examines the role and prospects for the Energy Community. Section 3 
looks at the fragile context in which the Energy Community seeks to operate across South-
Eastern  Europe.  Section  4  outlines  the  Europeanisation  programme  and  its  potential 
advantages for investment and the rule of law in the energy sector and section 5 offers a 
conclusion. 
2.  The Energy Community 
The Energy Community Treaty grew out of the European Union’s response to the Balkan 
wars  in  the  1990s. With  the  dissolution  of  Yugoslavia,  the  former  interconnected  energy 
                                                   
1 The Energy Community, established in October 2005 under an international treaty that entered into 
force in July 2006, aims to extend EU energy policy into non-EU countries. Its secretariat is located in 
Vienna. Section 2 of this paper describes in more detail its origins, membership and structure. 
2 See Energy Strategy of the Energy Community (Energy Community, 2012). 
3 Ibid., p. 9. DEPLOYING THE ENERGY INCENTIVE: REINFORCING EU INTEGRATION IN SOUTH-EAST EUROPE | 3 
 
networks were torn asunder by new borders and new state interests. Energy cooperation 
was initially developed via the South-East Europe Regional Energy Market, which was part 
of the Stability Pact for South-East Europe. Through what became known as the ‘Athens 
Process’ in 2003, negotiations commenced on transferring the EU’s energy acquis into South- 
Eastern Europe.4 These negotiations culminated in the signing of the Energy Community 
Treaty between the European Union and Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
FYROM and Albania in June 2005. The Treaty came into force on 1 July 2006, for an initial 
period  of  ten  years.  Moldova  and  Ukraine  subsequently  joined  in  2010  and  2011 
respectively.5 The Energy Community may well grow in size in the coming years. Georgia is 
already a candidate state for membership, and other Caucasus states may join over time.6 
The Energy Community aims to transfer the energy acquis of the European Union as it is 
developed into the laws of the Contracting States of the Community. There was a conscious 
modelling on the original European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) as an instrument that 
aimed  to  provide  “the  basis  for  a  broader  and  deeper  community  among  peoples  long 
divided by bloody conflicts”7 and provide a framework for cooperation between previously 
warring  parties.8  The  overall  aim  is  to  create  a  common  regulatory  framework  for  a 
liberalised  regional  energy  market  on  the  European  model.  This  includes  progressively 
taking  up  new  iterations  of  the  EU’s  liberalised  energy  regime  together  with  flanking 
environmental, supply security and competition measures. As a consequence, capital should 
also be encouraged to invest in an energy sector regulated largely on the European model. 
Institutionally the Community maintains a Ministerial Council, the highest policy-making 
level within the organisation consisting of ministerial representatives and representatives of 
the European Union. The standing Permanent High Level Group of senior officials of the 
states and the Union support the Ministerial Council. The Energy Community Regulatory 
Board,  composed  of  regulators  from  each  state  and  the  European  Commission  and  the 
Energy  Secretariat  are  based  in  Vienna,  which  deals  with  the  day-to-day  work  of  the 
Community.  There  is  no  court  system,  but  both  the  Energy  Secretariat  and  the  Energy 
Community  Regulatory  Board  can  initiate  a  dispute  settlement  procedure  before  the 
Ministerial Council, which has procedural affinity with the failure to comply with Union 
obligations provision of the EU Treaty. Ultimately a state’s rights under the Community 
Treaty can be suspended for non-compliance via the dispute settlement procedure – in other 
words, via a quasi-judicial mechanism.9 
                                                   
4 For a discussion of the Athens Process and its development, see Karova (2009) and Renner (2009).  
5 This paper focuses solely upon the initial signatory states of the Energy Community Treaty from 
South-East Europe. 
6 Turkey and Armenia have observer status. It is also possible that if the twin impact of the shale 
revolution  and  a  much  slower  growth  rate  of  the  Chinese  economy  over  the  next  decade  may 
motivate other states across Central Asia to consider Energy Community membership as a way to 
encourage capital investment.  
7 Preamble to the European Coal and Steel Community, Paris, 1951. 
8 See the European Commission’s press release, “The EU and South-East Europe sign a historic treaty 
to  boost  energy  integration”,  25  October  2005  (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-05-
1346_en.htm European Commission). 
9 For a discussion of how this model operates, see Buschle, 2011. 4 | ALAN RILEY 
 
The core Union conception of the Energy Community Treaty is that like the ECSC Treaty, in 
that it can grow and develop over time into a source of cooperation and harmonious and 
positive  development  with  numerous  positive  spill-over  effects.  The  difficulty  with  this 
concept, however, is that contexts of the origins of the ECSC and the Energy Community are 
wholly different.  
The ECSC was born in a context where the contracting states, despite their recent history of 
fascism, had a long rule of law tradition, reasonably sound public administration and strong 
civil society foundations. All those societies understood how a market economy functions 
and  were  populated  by  numerous  actors  who  could  participate  in  such  an  economy.  In 
addition, the US provided significant additional support, by its physical presence, both civil 
and military, and technical support. Above all the US provided access to enormous amounts 
of cheap capital to rebuild European energy infrastructures.  
By  contrast,  just  over  two  years  after  its  coming  into  being,  the  Energy  Community 
experienced  the  greatest  capital  crisis  in  modern  history.  In  addition,  the  Energy 
Community, while bringing the energy acquis (together with the other parts of the acquis 
relevant to the application of the energy acquis, such as core environmental, competition and 
public  procurement  rules)  of  the  Union  into  South-Eastern  Europe,  was  not granted  the 
supranational infrastructure to ensure uniform application of the acquis that exists within the 
EU. Given that the domestic legal infrastructure is much weaker than that of the EU member 
states  as  well,  the  likelihood  of  effective  application  of  the  acquis  is,  needless  to  say, 
problematic.  As  argued  below,  the  Ottoman,  authoritarian  and  Communist  heritage 
compounded by the impact of the Balkan Wars creates a context where the support systems 
that were available to the ECSC are much more limited and less effective in the context of the 
Energy Community. 
South-East Europe: A fragile context for the development of the EU energy 
acquis 
The energy acquis within the European Union is supported by strong rule of law culture,10 on 
the whole sound and capable public administration and backed by EU-level surveillance and 
enforcement. These support factors are necessary if the sophisticated energy liberalisation 
framework of the Union is to be constructed and then put into operation. These support 
factors are also key to ensuring that investors are willing to make major investments into 
Europe’s energy sector.  
The  difficulty  in  South-East  Europe  is  that  the EU’s  energy  acquis  is  transmitted  via  the 
Energy Community into a region with limited support factors. For a host of historical and 
current reasons, the rule of law and the quality of public administration are very weak. It is 
difficult to see how the energy acquis can easily prosper in such a fragile environment. 
A number of factors have created this situation. The negative historical context of the region 
for most of the period since the fall of Constantinople arose from either having been part of 
the  Ottoman  Empire,  under  the  control  of  the  Austrian  Empire,  or  having  been  run  as 
independent  authoritarian  states.  None  of  these  regimes  developed  a  strong  rule  of  law 
culture, nor a culture of sound and efficient public administration. 
                                                   
10 In his seminal work The Rule of Law, Lord Bingham (2011) makes a compelling modern case for the 
importance and value of the rule of law. DEPLOYING THE ENERGY INCENTIVE: REINFORCING EU INTEGRATION IN SOUTH-EAST EUROPE | 5 
 
This historical reality was then compounded by the creation of a Communist state where all 
the  organs  of  the  state  were  ‘harnessed  by  the  party’.11  The  executive,  legislature  and 
judiciary were under the control of the Communist Party undermining any true notion of the 
application of the rule of law.12 Law was merely a means of ensuring the will of the Party. 
The  collapse  of  Communism  in  the  region  also  triggered  a  major  conflict.  That  conflict 
exacerbated the already significant problems of creating a strong rule of law culture. It also 
led to the rise of illiberal political parties who became a major block to the development of 
European norms in relation to both law and public administration.13  
These illiberal parties sought to concentrate power in their hands, violating the principle of 
separation of powers, which in turn encouraged arbitrary rule. The political power of the 
illiberal governing parties was converted into economic power by corrupt privatisations.  
Even after the turbulent 1990s and the end of conflict, the adoption of formal democratic 
structures within the region did not do much to push the region in the direction of European 
norms. As Dolenec (2011) has argued, the region has undergone a ‘process of refeudalisation’ 
in which informal networks of legality became the structuring principle of governance. The 
rhetoric  of  liberal  democracy  may  be  presented  and  European  rules  may  be  formally 
adopted, yet insider networks control access to all the levers of power and continue to profit 
from their insider status. 
Clearly the prospect of European Union membership can act as a major pressure to adopt 
real  reform.  However,  with  the  notable  exception  of  Croatia,  there  appears  to  be  very 
significant resistance across the region from amongst the elites who have now benefited for 
20 years from the current structures to undertake such reform. It is very much an uphill 
struggle for the European Commission and the member states to bring the countries of the 
region to accept the value of European norms. This reality is illustrated below with some 
examples drawn from recent OECD and EU reports as well as media commentary. 
For example in its 2011 Assessment Report on Serbia, the OECD was quite blunt: “The state 
appears  largely  captured  by  vested  interests.14  The  European  Commission  2012  Progress 
Report  was  also  quite  frank.  Little  progress  was  found  to  have  been  made  on  judicial 
reform.15 It noted that the legal framework still leaves room for undue influence over the 
judiciary.16 The views of the OECD and the EU are underlined by a recent poll in June 2012 
by TNS Medium Gallup which found 87% took the view that the judicial system has a role to 
play (in dealing with corruption), but it is too corrupt to deal with corruption.17  
The OECD in its 2011Assessment Report on Albania is equally blunt: “Compliance with the 
law by the government is not ensured”.18 The report went on to say that “there is general 
disrespect for decisions of the courts, including the constitutional court”.19 
                                                   
11 See Strojin (2009). 
12 Ibid. 
13 See Dolenec (2011). 
14 See OECD (2011, p. 3). 
15 See European Commission (2012, p. 9). 
16 Ibid., p. 49. 
17 TNS Medium Gallup, June 2012. 
18 See OECD (2011b, p. 3). 6 | ALAN RILEY 
 
The latest OECD report for Bosnia-Herzegovina also makes disappointing reading in respect 
of the whole gamut of capture by vested interest, fidelity to the rule of law and corruption.20 
The 2011 OECD Assessment Report for FYROM is also far from positive. As in Serbia and 
Albania,  the  OECD  notes  the  centralisation  of  power  in  the  executive  branch.  It  also 
expresses  “serious  concern”  at  the  limited  extent  to  which  the  rule  of  law  is  put  into 
practice.21  
The OECD Report also refers obliquely to the Ivanovski case where a lustration law was 
deployed to remove the President of the Constitutional Court. Mr Ivanovski has now filed a 
case against FYROM with the European Court of Human Rights alleging violation of Articles 
6 and 8, breach of a right to a fair trial and his right to privacy.22 The ECHR Statement of 
Facts and Questions to the Parties in the case reinforces the concerns raised by the OECD. 
These include inadequate opportunities to respond to the allegations made, violation of the 
presumption of innocence (the President of the Supreme Court speaking to the media on the 
conclusion of an appeal several days before judgment was handed down) and allegations 
that judges who had been involved in the case were subsequently promoted, including to Mr 
Ivanovski’s own position on the Constitutional Court.23 
The  OECD  Assessment  Report  for  Kosovo  observes  that  Kosovo  is  “a  paradise  for 
corruption”24 and notes that the absence of visible results of fighting corruption also has a 
negative effect on the image of Kosovo. This darkening view is reinforced by the most recent 
European Commission Progress Report: “The limited independence and impartiality of the 
judiciary in practice is a serious impediment to strengthening the rule of law.”25  
The OECD Montenegro Report notes that ‘one major reason for the shortcomings in public 
governance is the lack of respect for the rule of law and democratic institutions by major 
actors’.26  
As  one  would  expect,  Croatia  demonstrates  a  more  substantial  attempt  to  adhere  to 
European  rule  of  law  standards.  The  latest  OECD  Assessment  Report  and  European 
Commission Progress Report are more positive on Croatia than for the other states of South-
East Europe. However, the OECD does note that respect for the rule of law remains a source 
of concern and needs to be continuously monitored.27 
Furthermore although there has been significant corruption in Croatia, since 2009 there has 
been an upward swing in anti-corruption investigations by the state. Several high-profile 
cases have been launched, most notably the prosecution and conviction of  former Prime 
Minister  Sanader  in  November  2012.28  This  conviction  demonstrates  the  commitment  of 
                                                                                                                                                               
19 Ibid., p. 5. 
20  OECD (2011c). 
21 See OECD (2011d). 
22 Ivanoski v. FYROM, Application No. 29908/11, lodged 9 May 2011. 
23 Ibid., Statement of Facts. 
24 See OECD (2011e, p. 6). 
25 European Commission (2012.b). 
26 OECD (2012, pp. 2-3).  
27 OECD (2011f, p. 4). 
28 “Croatia Gets Boost from Graft Conviction Ahead of EU Report”, Bloomberg, 21 November 2012. DEPLOYING THE ENERGY INCENTIVE: REINFORCING EU INTEGRATION IN SOUTH-EAST EUROPE | 7 
 
Croatia  to  tackle  corruption  even  at  the  highest  level  of  the  state.  This  positive  anti-
corruption signal is likely to be reinforced by the fact that there are a number of further 
outstanding  corruption  charges  to  be  brought  against  the  former  Prime  Minister.29  Any 
further convictions will underline that Croatia is moving heavily against corruption and is 
willing to uphold democratic integrity and the rule of law. 
Sanader’s initial oral statement30 in November 2012, however, does raise some questions as 
to the quality of judgments handed down in corruption cases and the risk of first-instance 
decisions being overturned on appeal. The language used in the Sanader case adopted a non-
judicial and nationalist tone in respect of the Croatian energy company INA. The focus of the 
judge for a significant part of the ruling appeared to be based on condemning Sanader for 
transferring  INA  to  a  foreign  management,  highlighting  more  a  lack  of  patriotism  than 
financial greed.31 This sort of language together with a lack of focus on the evidence does 
raise serious concerns even in Croatia.32 
Looking across all the OECD and European Commission Progress Reports for the region is a 
dispiriting  task.  There  are  a  number  of  alarming  features  through  all  these  reports.  The 
centralisation  of  executive  power  and  the  reduction  in  the  influence  of  Parliament,  are 
compounded  in  several  states  by  the  use  of  exceptional  emergency  procedures  to  adopt 
legislative programmes wholesale. There is a willingness to bend the judiciary to political 
ends and a preparedness on the part of public institutions to simply ignore court rulings and 
to  side-step  the  rights  of  constitutional  courts. The  scale  and  extent  of  corruption  across 
public life in the region are worrying as is the weakness of official response. One comes 
away with the sense that a substantial part of the ‘reform’ movement in the region is entirely 
generated  from  Brussels  and  Washington  and  would  collapse  if  it  were  not  for  external 
actors. 
Developing the energy incentive: Energy and the rule of law 
Given  the  discussion  above,  it  is  clearly  open  to  question  how  the  EU’s  energy  acquis 
contained in the Energy Community Treaty can actually function in South-East Europe. It is 
of course correct to note that all the states of the region are progressively on their way to 
European Union membership  and  that  in  order  to  obtain  membership  they  will  have  to 
significantly improve their adherence to the rule of law. However, it is clear from the scale of 
judicial dysfunctionality and elite preference for maintaining the current opacity and sub-
optimal effectiveness of their domestic institutions that the Union is on a very long and hard 
road  to  bring  these  states  in  the  direction  of  greater  adherence  to  the  rule  of  law  and 
membership of the Union. 
One negative factor however, could well be turned into a means to enhance the rule of law 
and  underpin  the  operation  of  the  Energy  Community  Treaty  acquis.  There  is  a  very 
                                                   
29 “Former Croatian Premier Faces New Charges”, Bloomberg, 13 December 2012.  
30 Even after seven months, no formal judgment has been handed down in this case. 
31 A rough English language translation can be found on the link below. It does appear to raise a 
number  of  concerns  in  terms  of  language,  legal  argument  and  reason.  See 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2012/2012-11-20-sanader-verdict.htm 
32 Ibid. Experts reports from a major international accounting firm appear to be dismissed for no 
compelling reason and reports from foreign state prosecutors ignored. 8 | ALAN RILEY 
 
substantial demand for sustainable and deliverable energy across the region.33 This is due to 
the ageing Communist-era infrastructure, which regularly cannot keep up with demand34 
and results in distribution losses as high as 22%.35 The very high levels of energy intensity 
are approximately 2.5 times higher than the European average.36 This is exacerbated by the 
lack of market integration across the region, which dissolved along with the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia.37 In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, there is not even energy market integration 
within the state.38 There is a substantial import dependency of over 90% for the region and 
save for some hydropower, an almost total dependence on fossil fuels.39  
As the Energy Community points out in its Energy Strategy paper adopted in October 2012: 
A  common  feature  (across  the  region)  is  that  the  main  elements  of  the  energy 
infrastructure (e.g. power plants) were built in the 1960s and 1970s, using standard 
East European technology. Their age and type of technology, and their inadequate 
maintenance raise serious policy challenges at present. There is an urgent need for 
large scale rehabilitation and replacement of infrastructure to avoid a situation in 
which considerable generation and transmission capacities are not available. 40 
The Energy Strategy paper underlines the scale of the task by pointing out that the state 
parties  to  the  Treaty  in  the  Balkans  region  estimate  they need  to provide  13GW  of new 
capacity at a cost of €28 billion by 2020. However, as the Strategy paper points out, since 
1990 the region has only seen 0.94GW of new utility scale plant put in place.41 This is indeed 
a heavy task: 
to  ensure  adequate  power supply,  the  region will  have  to  develop  its  generation 
plant fleet at a rate more than 10 times that seen over the past two decades.42 
This paper argues that these realities create an opportunity for the Union to create leverage 
amongst the power elites of the region. The demand for stable energy from consumers and 
industry,43 in combination with the scale of pollution in the cities across the region,44 creates 
                                                   
33 The most detailed recent discussion can be found in the IEA paper Energy in the Western Balkans: The 
Path to Reform and Reconstruction, Paris, 2008, pp. 17 ff. The paper provides an extensive discussion of 
the weaknesses of the regional energy infrastructure and the need for capital investment,  
34 Boromisa (2010) and Ralchev (2012). 
35  See  the  CSIS-EKIM  Policy  Report,  Delinking  the  Western  Balkans:  The  Energy  Dimension,  CSIS, 
Washington, D.C., 2012. 
36 Ibid, p. 4. 
37 The CSIS-EKIM (2012, p. 5) report makes the point that market integration in the energy sector had 
begun unravelling in the region even before the dissolution of the Yugoslav state. 
38 Rachev (2012, p. 4). 
39 Ibid., p. 2. 
40 Energy Community (2012, p. 9). 
41 Ibid., p. 12. 
42 Ibid. 
43 One of the major issues for consumers and industry is the inability of current power systems to 
maintain  stable  supply.  Hence,  there  is  no  backup  when  drier  summers  reduce  the  amount  of 
hydropower generation available; failures in the power systems from failing antique power plants and 
infrastructure or gas supply shortages. See OSW (2012). 
44 As reported in DW (2013). According to the WHO, Sarajevo has the worst air pollution of any 
European  city.  Tetovo  and  Skopje  in  Macedonia  are  not  far  behind.  There  are  also  specific  air DEPLOYING THE ENERGY INCENTIVE: REINFORCING EU INTEGRATION IN SOUTH-EAST EUROPE | 9 
 
domestic  and  industrial  constituencies  in support  of  investment  in  energy  infrastructure. 
New energy investment, particularly with respect to renewables and gas generation, can cut 
pollution plaguing cities across the region, and greater and more stable power supplies will 
themselves make it easier to attract further foreign investment. 
Despite their control of most local institutions, the elites are not all-powerful. They need to 
be able to command the support of sufficient numbers of voters to limit challenges to their 
power; they need to keep some business support on their side as well as demonstrate some 
commitment to the European Union if they are to progress towards membership. Delivering 
real change in local and regional energy markets will allow the elites to deliver on these 
goals. 
The weakness of the rule of law discussed above, however, will make it very difficult for the 
local elites to attract capital at a scale necessary to deliver such energy projects. It is notable 
that there has been no major oil or gas investment in the region for the last 30 years and as 
pointed out above, only 0.94GW of capacity has been added since 1990. The only significant 
development was the Hungarian pipeline project into Croatia, which was a European project 
connected with improving the Union’s own energy security and not with developing the 
regional energy market.45  
The argument of this paper is that the Union can leverage regional energy needs and the 
interests  of  the  local  elites  into  strengthening  the  Energy  Community  Treaty.46  By 
strengthening the Energy Community, the Union will also be reinforcing the processes of 
integration and the pathway to membership. 
One  contrary  view,  however,  holds  that  the  Contracting  Parties  should  ‘learn  to  fish’ 
themselves. In other words, the states that are Contracting Parties to the Energy Community 
have to come to grips with the rules of the energy acquis and flanking measures from the 
acquis, operating in support of the EU’s energy rules and case law. They will be supported by 
the  accession  programme  but  otherwise  they  have  to  develop  the  means  themselves  to 
support  the  energy  acquis  as  part  of  the  process  of  preparation  for  membership.  This 
‘learning to fish’ idea approach has a lot to recommend it. Candidate member states should 
be encouraged to develop the means to function with the acquis themselves.  
However, the difficulty with this approach is that it does not recognise the reality of the 
Balkans. Notwithstanding the interests of some reformists and those who see a means to 
deliver  to  particular  constituencies  a  significant  part  of  the  local  elites  and  the  state 
bureaucracies do not in fact want to learn to fish. They are happy with the current systems 
and structures.  
The key insight of this paper is that despite the dysfunctional governance described above 
the demands for a larger and more sustainable energy market create an opportunity for the 
                                                                                                                                                               
pollution  problems  from  individual  energy  installations  across  the  region.  See,  for  instance, 
Webpublicapress, “Air Pollution in Balkans Worst”, 27 December 2012, which describes the impact of 
pollutants from the oil refinery in Bosnia-Herzegovina at Bosanski Brod on the nearby Croatian town 
of Slavonoski Brod. 
45 CSIS & EKIM (2010, p. 5). 
46 This is not a region where energy can be a source of corruption itself as there is very little domestic 
oil or gas production. The elites who want to deliver energy goods need to encourage the inflow of 
private capital to the region. Hence they have some incentive to comply with the rule of law to attract 
that capital. 10 | ALAN RILEY 
 
Union to generate support within the region. However, that support is only likely to be 
generated if the Energy Community Treaty rules are reinforced. In other words, the ‘learning 
to fish’ approach only works if the Union provides EU legal hooks that businesses, NGOs 
and consumers can themselves deploy. In addition, the Energy Secretariat would be left with 
the weak quasi-judicial enforcement mechanisms under the Treaty. 
The question therefore is what sort of EU legal hooks work best. One approach would be to 
adopt  the  approach  of  the  comprehensive  air  services  agreement  for  South-East  Europe 
under the European Common Aviation Area (ECAA), which provides for the extension of 
the acquis in respect of air transport to non-EU states in the region. The ECAA in the region 
provides for access to the European Court of Justice’s preliminary reference procedure to 
ensure uniform application of the air transport rules for the EU and the Balkan ECAA.  
It is clear that a reference procedure would provide some positive attributes. It would assist 
the uniform interpretation of the energy acquis in the region. It would provide some ‘backup’ 
to local judges seeking to comply with the rule of law. However, it is far from clear that a 
preliminary reference procedure provides sufficient reinforcement to the energy acquis. The 
ECAA only deals with air transport where states have a direct vested interest to comply with 
the rules to obtain route access to other states. By contrast, there are very substantial vested 
interests  within  the  region  that  are  likely  to see  energy  liberalisation  as  a threat  to  their 
ability to obtain monopoly rents. Those interested parties would perceive liberalisation as a 
zero=sum  game.  That  would  be  unlikely  to  be  the  case  with  respect  to  air  transport 
liberalization. Most states and local economic interests would want to promote access to the 
rest of Europe and therefore would be much more willing to accept European air transport 
obligations. In addition, the introduction of the energy acquis via the Energy Community 
Treaty involves a considerable number of flanking measures from competition law, public 
procurement and environmental law.  
Given  the  vested  and  captured  state  interests  discussed  above  and  the  attractiveness  of 
monopoly  rents  from  the  energy  sector,  a  stronger  judicial  underpinning  of  the  Energy 
Community Treaty would provide a means of challenging those interests. Both interests in 
favour  of  liberalisation,  such  as  private  businesses  seeking  to  develop  the  market  and 
consumer groups, could deploy stronger legal hooks. Equally, the Energy Secretariat would 
be able to play a greater role to ensure effective application of the rule of law in the sector.  
A juridical strengthening of the Energy Community would also encourage investment into 
the region as investors would have greater security as to the application of the rule of law 
and open markets. Such a strengthened Community would also provide advantages to those 
parts of the local elites who seek political advantage in delivering stable and sustainable 
energy supplies. 
This  Europeanisation  approach  supported  by  this  author  would  develop  the  Energy 
Community further along the European model. As outlined above, the weakness of the rule 
of law in the region makes it very difficult to rely on domestic courts and ensure effective 
application  of  legal  rules.  There  is  therefore  a  compelling  argument  that  the  Energy 
Community at the very least needs to develop its own legal order with its own court system, 
modelled on the EFTA court based in Luxembourg. The Energy Community Court (ECCt) 
would receive direct actions brought by the Secretariat, the Contracting Parties and private 
parties  with  a  legitimate  interest.  The  ECCt  would  also  be  able  to  receive  preliminary 
references from national courts. This would reinforce the energy acquis across the region and 
create legal precedents which individuals and companies could rely upon, and the prospect DEPLOYING THE ENERGY INCENTIVE: REINFORCING EU INTEGRATION IN SOUTH-EAST EUROPE | 11 
 
of an adverse ruling in the ECCt would reduce the prospect of domestic court systems being 
gamed or unduly influenced. 
The ECCt would have a direct impact on the application of the energy acquis and the EU 
flanking measures under the Energy Community Treaty. It would reinforce the rule of law in 
the  region  and  support  a  besieged  judiciary.  It  would  also  introduce  a  degree  of 
transparency into energy disputes and create a significant number of legal precedents which 
those seeking to enforce the rule of law can deploy. The ECCt would also be likely to have 
significant  spill-over  effects.  One  such  effect  would  be  one  where  ECCt  precedents  and 
practices simply encourage stronger adherence to the rule of law in the region. The second 
type of spill-over effect is where the ECCt precedents are used to reinforce the accession 
process itself as the precedents in relation to flanking measures under the acquis as well as 
the core energy acquis are applied broadly by courts in the region. This secondary spill-over 
effect can be reinforced by extending the scope of the acquis to cover all environmental fields 
that  could  impact  on  the  energy  sector  and  the  application  of  all  the  free  movement 
competences not just goods, but also services, establishment and capital in the energy sector. 
Under this more European model, the Energy Secretariat would be the regional European 
Commission in the energy sector. It would clearly need an equivalent of Regulation 1/2003 
to enforce the competition rules in respect of the energy sector. It would also require an 
equivalent  of  the merger  regulation.  As  is  evidenced  by  the success  of  the  2005  Sectoral 
Enquiry on EU energy liberalisation, antitrust law is one of the principal means to ensure full 
compliance with the Union’s liberalisation objectives.47 
The impact of further Europeanisation of the Energy Community would be to significantly 
enhance  the  investment  prospects  for  the  region’s  energy  sector.  Greater  liberalisation 
operating under clear and stable legal rules will encourage investment. There would also be 
as  discussed  above  a  significant  spill-over  effect  as  the  judgments  of  the  ECCt  and  the 
decisions of the Secretariat began to recognised and felt across the region. The precedential 
value and model of such rulings would reinforce the application of the rule of law and make 
it more difficult for judicial dysfunction to maintain its hold on the region’s courts. 
Although  only  focused  on  energy,  the  likelihood  is  that  this  sectoral  programme  would 
generate significant additional spill-over effects. The establishment of stronger rule-of-law 
norms  in  the  energy  sector  and  the  driving  out  of  corruption  would  also  make  it  more 
difficult to maintain lower standards in the rest of the economy. A broad constituency would 
be likely to demand that the same standards be applied across the country. In essence, one of 
the concerns that appears again and again in OECD and EU reports, namely that the pro-rule 
of  law  and  anti-corruption  agenda  is  only  being  pushed  externally,  would  have  been 
answered.  By  targeting  the  energy  sector,  the  Union  could  trigger  internal  pressures 
supporting adherence to European norms. 
Conclusions: Improving the context for the Energy Community 
If the Union continues with the existing strategy of relying on potential membership of the 
Union combined with horizontal measures to encourage adherence to the rule of law, the 
energy acquis is likely to become a fossilised regime of formalistic rules and little practical 
utility. Equally the path to membership of the Union for the states of South-East Europe will 
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continue  to  be  a  difficult  uphill  journey.  The Union  needs  to  consider  new  measures  to 
accelerate the pace of compliance with European norms in the region. Creating a sectoral 
programme for the regional energy market is one place to start.  
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